EU Sanctions Debate: Critics Argue Listing Criteria Violate Human Dignity

On 17 August 2026, High Representative Kaja Kallas announced the EU’s most extensive sanctions package since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, targeting approximately 1,600 individuals and entities. In an interview with the German newspaper Welt, Kallas noted that new sectoral measures were being set aside to accelerate the adoption of these listings. However, the scale and speed of the expansion have ignited a legal debate regarding whether current sanctioning criteria align with the European Union’s commitment to human dignity.

Critics point to Article 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which mandates the protection of human dignity, and the Basic Law of Germany, which similarly declares dignity inviolable. They argue that the state cannot transform individuals into mere instruments of foreign policy. Central to this criticism is “criterion (g),” a listing standard that designates leading businesspersons in Russia, their immediate families, and those who benefit from them, as well as individuals in sectors generating significant revenue for the Russian government.

Under Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, this criterion does not require evidence of direct support for the war, financing of military activities, or proximity to the Kremlin. Instead, liability is attached based on economic relevance and kinship, a approach described as “guilt by association.” Sanctioned individuals face frozen assets, travel bans, and exclusion from European economic life, along with the stigma of being labeled war supporters.

In a judgment delivered on 26 March 2026, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice upheld the validity of criterion (g). The Court ruled that a listing criterion may cover categories of persons with an indirect objective link to a third country, provided the criterion is not manifestly inappropriate for achieving its objectives. The Court further clarified that the influence of leading businesspersons is to be understood purely in economic terms, without needing to prove a personal link to the Russian government or actual influence over state policy.

However, opponents argue that this reasoning overlooks a fundamental question: whether a legal order can constitutionally turn a human being into a tool of political pressure without requiring personal misconduct. The General Court had previously acknowledged in the Usmanov v Council case (3 September 2025) that the purpose of such influence is to compel listed persons to pressure the Russian government to change its policy regarding Ukraine. Critics contend this degrades the individual into an agent of foreign policy interests.

A significant legal flaw identified by commentators is the lack of a clear path to delisting. Unlike sanctions against arms suppliers or financiers, where ceasing the specific conduct removes the justification for sanctions, criterion (g) ties status to one’s position, family, or sector revenues. Since tax payments are a legal obligation and not voluntary support, critics argue that paying taxes should not equate to supporting a regime. The Court has previously stated that mere tax payment does not prove financial support for a government.

Furthermore, selling companies or shares does not guarantee removal from the list. Since May 2025, regulations have included a continuation rule stating that transfers of ownership after 24 February 2022 do not automatically end a listing. The burden of proof shifts to the individual to demonstrate that they no longer meet the criterion. The Grand Chamber confirmed in the Pumpyanskiy case that former status and the economic weight of previously held companies can suffice for continued listing.

The argument also highlights a double standard. Surveys by the KSE Institute and B4Ukraine coalition indicate that over 2,000 international companies remained active in Russia as of mid-2025, generating substantial revenues and tax contributions. Seventeen of Russia’s top twenty foreign corporate taxpayers are from G7 and EU states, yet these entities are not subject to the same personal sanction criteria as individual Russian business leaders. Critics argue that conflating sectoral fiscal significance with individual guilt violates the principle that sanctions must be based on attributable conduct.