Why Eritrea’s Role Is Critical as Tigray Fighting Resurfaces

Fighting has intensified in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, raising urgent concerns that the volatile area could once again draw in its neighbor, Eritrea. The escalation, which began on September 23, saw Tigrayan forces capture three local airports while clashes spread into the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions. Both sides have traded accusations over who initiated the renewed hostilities, posing a direct threat to the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement that previously ended the devastating two-year war.

The resumption of violence occurs just days after the United States removed key Eritrean entities and individuals from its sanctions list, a move that experts warn could embolden the authoritarian regime and alter the strategic calculus of the conflict. Martin Plaut, a British journalist specializing in the Horn of Africa, noted that Washington views Eritrea as a vital partner in securing the Red Sea against Houthi militants backed by Iran. By lifting sanctions, the US has granted new political legitimacy to one of Africa’s most repressive governments.

“Trump has now mended fences with Eritrea and has lifted sanctions against Eritrea in an effort to reduce the threat posed by the Houthis and secure the Red Sea,” Plaut stated. He cautioned that the current tensions carry the potential to spiral into a broader regional confrontation, describing it as “the most serious danger.”

The timing of the US decision has drawn scrutiny. On September 18, Washington allowed the national emergency underpinning its Ethiopia-related sanctions regime to expire, subsequently removing senior financial official Hagos Ghebrehiwet and the Red Sea Trading Corporation from its sanctions list. These measures had originally been imposed in 2021 in connection with the previous Tigray war. While US officials have not characterized the move as an endorsement of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, it effectively removes a layer of pressure on a government whose strategic importance has grown amid deteriorating security around the Red Sea.

Abdurahman Sayed, director of the Horn of Africa Centre for Regional Integration, highlighted the broader geopolitical shifts driving this engagement. “It is happening at a time when the war on Iran is ongoing,” he told DW. “The Strait of Hormuz has been blocked for some time, and now the Bab el-Mendeb on the Red Sea, where Eritrea is located, this may give Eritrea some advantage to establish a meaningful relationship with the US.”

Eritrea’s strategic value lies in its control of a long coastline opposite Yemen, with its southern port of Assab lying near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. Moses Okello, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies in Addis Ababa, argued that the regional context has fundamentally shifted since the last conflict. “In 2020, the concern was the TPLF versus the Ethiopian National Defense Force,” Okello said. “Today, the entire Middle East is up in flames, and now the tensions in the Red Sea. So this changes the strategic value of not just the Eritrean coast, but the entire Red Sea waterway.”

The current crisis in northern Ethiopia appears linked to a political alliance formed on September 21 by seven armed and political groups, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara Fano National Movement, and the Oromo Liberation Army. The coalition aims to overthrow Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government, uniting former adversaries against the federal center. Fighting erupted two days after this announcement, with Tigrayan forces seizing airports and clashes spreading into adjacent territories.

Questions remain about whether Eritrea will intervene militarily. During the 2020–22 war, Eritrean troops fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces, but relations between President Afwerki and Prime Minister Abiy have since deteriorated, particularly over Ethiopia’s demand for sea access. The Ethiopian government has accused Eritrea of supporting armed groups in the new conflict, allegations Eritrea denies. While there is no public evidence that the sanctions lift was intended to encourage Eritrean intervention, analysts warn that if the Tigray conflict intensifies, Asmara may see a direct security interest in entering the fray.

Such a scenario would transform an internal Ethiopian conflict into a potential interstate war, exacerbating an already fragile region. Sudan remains at war, Somalia is unstable, and disputes over the Nile continue between Ethiopia and Egypt. Furthermore, rivalries involving Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran add further complexity. Plaut warned that regional alliances could interact dangerously: “You have the UAE backing the RSF and you have the Saudis backing the Eritreans and the Sudanese Armed Forces… This could all multiply and you could get one conflict leading into another.”

For President Afwerki, the end of sanctions represents a significant diplomatic opportunity, freeing Eritrea from international pressure and highlighting the strategic weight of its Red Sea location. However, experts caution that as Eritrea becomes more central to US security calculations, concerns about its authoritarian record and past military interventions may be sidelined. For Ethiopia, the immediate challenge is halting the fighting before it drags in Eritrea; for Washington, it is engaging Asmara as a security partner without granting it greater freedom to destabilize the region.