Ukraine Faces Acute Troop Shortages After Four Years of War

KYIV, Ukraine — Despite world-leading advances in drone warfare, Ukraine is confronting a persistent and worsening shortage of troops on the front lines as the conflict enters its fifth year. While Kyiv’s technological innovations have shifted tactical dynamics, the nation remains outmanned by Russia, and the need for personnel has become increasingly urgent, according to commanders and defense analysts.

Some military units are currently operating at only 50% strength, limiting their ability to capitalize on battlefield advantages created by drone superiority. “Based on the equipment and the number of people we have today, we barely have enough to hold the sector we currently have,” said a deputy commander of the Da Vinci Wolves battalion, who requested the pseudonym “Afer” due to military regulations. Located near Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, his unit is among those under intense pressure from Russian offensives. “To move forward would inevitably mean greater losses,” he added.

The recruitment crisis is compounded by long-standing issues with mobilization, including draft evasion and desertion. Military experts note these challenges make it difficult to build reserves across the 1,250-kilometer (775-mile) front line. Nick Reynolds of the Royal United Services Institute, a U.K.-based defense think tank, emphasized that Ukraine lacks the strategic depth to commit forces quickly without weakening other sectors. This limitation prevents commanders from converting temporary gains into sustained operations.

Reynolds also highlighted that insufficient troop numbers prevent adequate rotation, leading to soldier exhaustion and higher casualty rates. In July, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy orchestrated a shake-up in the Defense Ministry, replacing Mykhailo Fedorov with Yevhenii Khmara. The ministry is now pursuing reforms in mobilization, training, and army organization. However, an anonymous official stated simply, “There just are not enough people.”

Developing a new mobilization policy, which may include incentives for deserters to return to duty, is among the most sensitive issues being debated. Fedorov had previously proposed reorganizing the military around fewer, stronger units and reforming contracts with higher salaries and fixed terms. Khmara has indicated he intends to continue these structural changes, though lawmakers report that specific mobilization initiatives have yet to be presented.

Recruitment remains a significant challenge in a country of approximately 39 million people. According to U.N. figures cited by Ukraine’s National Health System, there are about 6.8 million men aged 25-59, a pool diminished by war-related displacement and migration. This figure includes wounded veterans and those medically unfit for service. Official military strength is estimated at 1 million, with only a small fraction deployed directly at the front.

Compulsory service applies exclusively to men, though over 70,000 women are serving in volunteer or specialized medical and pharmaceutical roles as of early 2025. In March, Fedorov estimated that roughly 2 million Ukrainian men were evading service, while about 200,000 had deserted or left their units without authorization. Desertion carries a penalty of up to 12 years in prison. Meanwhile, approximately 950,000 men currently hold deferments requested by businesses.

Russia, with a population of an estimated 143 million, also faces manpower difficulties. After an unpopular partial mobilization of 300,000 reservists early in the war, the Kremlin has relied on volunteers attracted by pay and benefits to maintain a force of roughly 700,000 soldiers, according to President Vladimir Putin.

Taras Chmut, a military analyst and head of the charity Come Back Alive, argued that Ukraine’s primary issue is not merely the quantity of personnel but their management and deployment. He noted that increasing troop numbers does not automatically enhance effectiveness. Instead, factors such as exhaustion, poor organization, inadequate training, and the lack of a clear end date for service drive recruits to desert.

At the front, the consequences are immediate. Afer reported that his battalion’s area of responsibility has doubled while its strength halved, forcing the same number of soldiers to defend twice the territory. He stated that ideally, twice as many troops would be needed just to hold current positions, let alone maintain a reserve for casualties. Additionally, there is a shortage of qualified specialists capable of operating sophisticated modern equipment.

Analysts suggest that while Ukraine can conduct localized offensives, such as recent operations near Lyman and in the Dnipropetrovsk region, these are unlikely to shift the broader battlefield balance. Pavlo Narozhnyi, a Ukrainian military analyst, described these actions as “relatively small” but sufficient for holding defensive lines.

President Zelenskyy cited figures indicating that Russian forces have occupied approximately 990 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2026, while Ukraine has retaken about 820 square kilometers. Kyiv aims to close this gap by year’s end. However, Reynolds cautioned that the front line is expected to remain largely unchanged, with no fundamental shifts in the overall strategic balance.