Beyond the Binary: How ‘Right’ and ‘Left’ Have Transformed in Israeli Politics

For international observers, the political spectrum in Israel often appears familiar, but the terms “right” and “left” carry distinctly different meanings than in Europe or the United States. While Western politics typically revolve around taxation, welfare, immigration, and the size of government, the Israeli divide has historically centered on the Palestinians, territory, security, settlements, and the tension between the state’s Jewish character and its democratic institutions.

Economic and social policies do exist but often cut across traditional camps rather than defining them. A politician may support state intervention in the economy yet be firmly right-wing, while another may be socially liberal while remaining in the nationalist camp. The original chasm between Labor Zionism’s collectivist model and Likud’s Revisionist, market-friendly tradition has faded, replaced by a focus on the occupied territories since 1967 and the Oslo Accords of the 1990s.

The second Intifada dealt a severe blow to the left among Jewish voters, with many interpreting the violence as proof that concessions failed to produce peace. This sentiment hardened after the 2005 Gaza withdrawal and Hamas’s subsequent takeover. The October 7, 2023 attacks did not create this shift but accelerated it, making security and Jewish identity even more paramount.

Today, being right-wing in Israel primarily means adopting a harder line on Palestinian national claims and territorial control. This includes rejecting a sovereign Palestinian state or accepting only limited self-rule. Illegal settlements in the West Bank are no longer viewed by the right as temporary bargaining chips; for some, they are a security asset, and for others, a religious and national mission. The Jewish nation-state is the central frame of reference.

Unlike the US conservative bloc, the Israeli right is not unified by a single theory of markets. While Likud remains relatively market-oriented, right-wing politics comfortably accommodates subsidies, public employment, and housing support when they serve coalition needs. Likud continues to be the main vehicle for this camp, blending nationalism and skepticism toward Palestinian statehood with a broad appeal to secular and religious voters alike. To its right sit parties like Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit, where nationalism is intertwined with a more explicit religious interpretation of the land.

These newer right-wing currents have been more willing than the older Likud establishment to confront the Supreme Court and the attorney general, viewing them as obstacles to an elected majority. The pre-war judicial reform debate stemmed from this suspicion, arguing that elected politicians should reclaim power. Although postponed by the war, the issue has resurfaced.

The Zionist center and the remnants of the left occupy a different space, though not as far from the right as some outside observers assume. Figures like Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot can support major military operations while advocating for institutional guardrails and a cautious approach to annexation. The gap between the center and the right is now less about the use of force and more about its purpose, institutional restraint, and the possibility of a future political arrangement.

The Zionist left has shrunk significantly since the Labor era. Parties linked to the peace camp have struggled to convince voters that negotiations yield security. Consequently, the term “left” has become nearly stigmatized in Jewish Israeli discourse, often implying naivety on security or a prioritization of universal principles over Jewish nationalism.

However, a social and economic left exists that advocates for housing, labor protections, and reduced inequality without necessarily endorsing the territorial formulas of the 1990s. This distinction is often lost in political discourse, where the label is weaponized to dismiss any opposition to occupation.

Traditional left-right axes also struggle to categorize Haredi parties like Shas and United Torah Judaism. While socially conservative, their economic positions are not purely right-wing; they seek public funding for religious institutions and welfare for large families. Their alignment with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc is driven by budgetary and autonomy concerns rather than nationalism.

Similarly, parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, such as Hadash, Ra’am, and Balad, fall outside the Zionist spectrum. Hadash combines socialist economics with anti-occupation stances, while Ra’am is socially conservative but pragmatically engaged in coalition politics. Balad centers Palestinian national identity. Labeling them all simply as “left” obscures their significant differences.

As Israel heads into the October 27 election, the political center of gravity has shifted so far to the right that many consequential arguments now take place within a broadly right-leaning field. Assumptions once considered centrist—such as deep suspicion of a sovereign Palestinian state and high tolerance for military control—are now mainstream. The remaining disputes concern the permanence of military rule, the role of settlements, judicial restraint, and the status of Palestinians. These disagreements will continue to shape the state, even as the older political center moves further into the past.