During the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian secured significant political backing from member states. The SCO issued a condemnation of the military strikes against Iran, characterizing them as breaches of international law and the UN Charter, while reaffirming Tehran’s sovereignty and urging a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.
However, the organization stopped short of offering any collective defense commitment. This distinction between political solidarity and military protection highlights a critical feature of the evolving global order: while multipolarity expands the strategic choices available to middle powers, it does not necessarily provide the security guarantees they previously associated with alliance membership.
For years, analysts suggested that non-Western institutions like BRICS and the SCO would form an alternative bloc to the US-led system, offering member states insulation from Western pressure. The conflict in Iran demonstrates that these relationships cannot replicate the security assurances provided by formal military treaties. Instead of replacing existing alliance structures, the new order is creating a dense network of overlapping partnerships where states gain economic and diplomatic flexibility without acquiring new security guarantees.
Turkiye exemplifies this complex reality. Despite its decades-long membership in NATO, Ankara has pursued a strategy of avoiding binary choices, maintaining ties with Russia and China while participating in the SCO as a dialogue partner. This approach allows Turkiye to leverage NATO for security benefits it cannot obtain elsewhere while expanding its diplomatic and economic options through relationships with regional actors and major powers alike.
Brazil similarly illustrates this trend. Although it lacks a formal military alliance with the United States, it continues to resist automatic political alignment with Washington. By declining to join the US-led Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition and taking independent stances on the Iran war, Brazil seeks to preserve its ability to cooperate with both Western and non-Western partners without swapping dependence on one for the other.
India has adopted this logic as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, participating in the US-led Quad while remaining a member of both BRICS and the SCO. At the Bishkek summit, New Delhi supported declarations defending Iranian sovereignty while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz to its Iranian counterpart.
Gulf Cooperation Council members, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, are pursuing similar diversification strategies. They continue to rely on the US for security while deepening economic and diplomatic ties with China, India, and other Asian powers. None appear eager to replace Washington with Beijing; rather, they seek to maintain relationships with both.
This shift suggests that the most significant impact of multipolarity is the declining necessity for middle and smaller powers to attach themselves exclusively to any single bloc. The proliferation of partners reduces the cost of dissent, allowing governments to disagree with dominant powers without facing total isolation.
Nevertheless, this autonomy comes with substantial risks. The same flexible arrangements that enable states to avoid choosing sides offer fewer guarantees during existential crises. Neither BRICS nor the SCO includes provisions equivalent to Article 5 of the NATO treaty, and the SCO explicitly defines itself as a non-military organization. Strategic partnerships may yield weapons, investment, and diplomatic support, but they rarely obligate partners to go to war.
The resulting international system is not a simple transition from a US-led order to a Chinese-led one, nor is it a clear confrontation between two defined blocs. NATO and US security frameworks remain central to stability in Europe, Asia, and the Gulf. What is emerging alongside them is a more fluid landscape of selective partnerships and transactional relationships.
In this environment, middle and smaller powers enjoy greater agency and bargaining power, but they also bear greater responsibility for their own security. The new world offers more options and more freedom to say no, but it provides less certainty about who will say yes when protection is needed.
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