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Why Kim Jong Un Sees No Urgency in Reaching a Deal with the US

Why Kim Jong Un Sees No Urgency in Reaching a Deal with the US

Last month, US President Donald Trump initiated a renewed diplomatic overture toward Pyongyang, significantly reducing joint military drills with South Korea and offering high praise to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump stated that the North Korean leader “has always treated me with great respect.” However, Pyongyang’s response has been dismissive, characterized by missile launches and public denials of Trump’s claims that Kim is positively receptive to negotiations.

As the US, South Korea, and Japan recently launched a five-day military exercise without any indication of a US pullback or diplomatic breakthrough, Kim commissioned a new naval destroyer on Monday. He reiterated the necessity of a “powerful and reliable nuclear war deterrent” and announced upcoming advancements in maritime defense capabilities.

Analysts suggest that unlike the summit diplomacy of Trump’s first term, Kim currently faces little pressure to secure a grand bargain with Washington. Joon Ha Park, a correspondent at Seoul-based Korea Risk Group, told DW that the stakes are significantly lower for Kim than in 2019. “North Korea now has a treaty-based alliance with Moscow and is drawing closer to Beijing, while its military capabilities have expanded significantly,” Park explained. “That’s why a single reduction in ROK-US military exercises is not enough for Pyongyang to be swayed.”

Park noted that Kim appears to be in the strongest position since assuming power in 2011. This stands in stark contrast to six years ago, when the leader visibly expressed regret during the 75th anniversary of the Korean Workers’ Party, citing the failures imposed by crippling sanctions and the coronavirus pandemic. Today, South Korea’s central bank reported that North Korea’s economy grew by 3.7% in 2024, marking its fastest expansion in eight years.

Pyongyang’s diplomatic isolation has also eroded. Following a pivotal 2023 summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, North Korea began supplying arms to support Russia’s war in Ukraine, receiving cash, food, and military technology in return. This alliance alarmed traditional benefactor China, prompting Beijing to actively reassert its influence. By September 2025, Kim stood alongside Xi Jinping and Putin at Beijing’s Victory Day celebrations—a rare public milestone for the reclusive regime. The partnership deepened further in June 2026 when Xi made his first foreign trip of the year to Pyongyang.

Notably, recent joint communiqués from these high-level meetings omitted any reference to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” language that had previously been standard in diplomatic discussions with both Moscow and Beijing. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to accelerate its nuclear program. In February 2026, Kim declared the country’s nuclear status “irreversible” and called for force expansion. Satellite imagery indicates increased activity at known nuclear sites.

Pyongyang now insists that Washington recognize it as a nuclear weapons state before any talks can proceed, explicitly rejecting future summits that include denuclearization agendas. Experts estimate North Korea possesses approximately 60 nuclear warheads, double the 20 to 30 estimated during the 2018-2019 diplomatic period.

“North Korea is no longer looking for talks centered on denuclearization or even traditional arms control. It increasingly wants recognition, implicitly or otherwise, as a nuclear weapons state,” said Park. He added that a summit excluding denuclearization could be framed by Pyongyang as implicit US acceptance of its nuclear status.

The effectiveness of international sanctions has also diminished. Alexander Lipke, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, noted that independent sanctions enforcement has largely collapsed as Russia and China no longer actively pursue non-proliferation stances. Consequently, North Korea no longer requires a deal for sanctions relief. Instead, the potential bargain has shifted: Pyongyang may seek a freeze on nuclear development in exchange for full international recognition as a de facto nuclear state.

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