ADDIS ABABA – Renewed conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region is raising alarms across the Horn of Africa, bringing the positions of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia into sharp focus. While both Gulf nations hold significant strategic interests in the area, their approaches to the crisis diverge, with Abu Dhabi openly supporting Ethiopia’s federal government and Riyadh drawing on a history of regional mediation.
The violence threatens to undo the November 2022 Pretoria peace accord that halted the war between Addis Ababa and Tigrayan forces. Compounding the instability are escalating tensions with neighboring Eritrea, prompting analysts to examine how external powers are navigating the crisis.
UAE: Public Support Without Clear Leverage
On September 25, the UAE issued a statement condemning attacks by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and allied militias against federal troops, as well as the seizure of airports in Tigray and spillover violence in the Afar and Amhara regions. Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, the UAE’s minister of state, reaffirmed support for Ethiopia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, calling for de-escalation, civilian protection, and adherence to the Pretoria Agreement.
While Abu Dhabi’s stance clearly favors the federal government, it remained unclear whether the UAE is providing military aid or has secured commitments from warring parties to cease hostilities. Commercial ties further explain the UAE’s interest in regional stability; Dubai Ports World operates the Berbera port in Somaliland, and a shipping route established in 2025 links the port to Jebel Ali in the UAE, offering an alternative trade corridor for landlocked Ethiopia, which relies heavily on Djibouti for maritime access following Eritrea’s 1993 independence.
However, these economic links do not necessarily translate into political influence. It remains uncertain whether the UAE can leverage its relationship with Addis Ababa to pressure the TPLF, persuade Eritrea to back down, or alter Ethiopia’s military strategy.
Saudi Arabia: Diplomatic Footprint and Strategic Ambiguity
Saudi Arabia has not yet issued a public statement regarding the latest Tigray clashes, according to an October 1 analysis by Critical Threats. Nevertheless, the kingdom had engaged in diplomatic efforts earlier in the year to ease tensions between the federal government and the TPLF.
Riyadh has previously attempted to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In November 2025, Chatham House reported that Saudi officials offered to facilitate talks amid rising disputes over maritime access and security. A June 2026 analysis by Germany’s SWP think tank noted that previous Saudi mediation attempts failed, partially because negotiations overlooked Ethiopia’s desire for access to the Eritrean port of Assab.
Broader regional alignments also shape the landscape. An August 2026 Soufan Center analysis suggested that Saudi Arabia and Egypt support Eritrea’s opposition to Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions. This assessment, however, does not constitute proof of direct military support to either Eritrea or the TPLF. Riyadh maintains a vital interest in Red Sea security due to its importance for global shipping and Saudi oil exports, but its level of active diplomatic engagement remains unclear.
Egypt’s Role and Regional Rivalries
Egypt’s involvement is driven by its longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and its deepening ties with Eritrea. Cairo asserts that Red Sea governance belongs to coastal states, a view shared by Asmara, adding friction to Ethiopia’s quest for sea access.
In September, Ethiopian Army Chief Field Marshal Birhanu Jula accused Egypt and Sudan of backing armed groups, including the TPLF, fighting the federal government. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Nader Zaki, rejected suggestions of interference, reaffirming Cairo’s commitment to non-interference and sovereignty, though he did not specifically address the allegations regarding the TPLF.
The relationship between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has strengthened, with leaders meeting in Cairo on June 8, 2026, to discuss bilateral cooperation and Red Sea security. While the meeting highlighted closer Cairo-Asmara coordination, it did not confirm Egyptian involvement in the Tigray fighting.
Risks of a Wider Crisis
The conflict risks expanding beyond Tigray. Ethiopia’s push for maritime access has heightened tensions with Eritrea, which controls the port of Assab. Addis Ababa views sea access as a national priority, while Asmara views any such move as a threat to its sovereignty. Ethiopia has alleged Eritrean troop crossings and support for rebel groups, claims Eritrea denies while urging UN Security Council intervention.
A broader confrontation could endanger civilians, hinder humanitarian aid, and disrupt regional trade. The UAE’s alignment with Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic history offer potential channels for engagement, but current evidence does not indicate either nation is leading containment efforts. Ultimately, the Pretoria Agreement remains the framework for settlement, but durable peace depends on the conflicting parties themselves, with external partners playing a secondary role in encouraging restraint and credible negotiations.
Interesting that the UAE-Ethiopia shipping route is such a key factor. Economics often drives these Gulf powers more than ideology.
Egypt’s involvement via the GERD dispute complicates everything. It feels like a proxy war with civilian lives as collateral damage.
Saudi Arabia’s silence speaks volumes. Are they still trying to mediate, or have they quietly pivoted to supporting Eritrea’s stance?
It is alarming how quickly the Pretoria Accord is fraying. We need actionable diplomacy, not just statements of support.
The UAE’s commercial interests seem clearer than its political leverage. Can Dubai really pressure the TPLF without overstepping?