Fighting reported in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region signals more than a temporary surge in tensions between Addis Ababa and regional leaders; it threatens the stability of the fragile peace deal established in 2022. The violence raises critical questions about the longevity of that agreement and the future trajectory of the conflict.
Between 2020 and 2022, Ethiopia endured a devastating civil war between the federal government and Tigray’s regional leadership. The conflict expanded to involve neighboring areas and foreign troops from Eritrea, resulting in a humanitarian catastrophe that displaced millions and caused hundreds of thousands of deaths. Although a peace accord in late 2022 curbed the worst of the bloodshed, it left significant political and territorial disputes unresolved.
Witnesses in the border towns of Abala and Erebti confirmed to DW that clashes have occurred between Tigray forces and Ethiopian federal troops. Humanitarian sources corroborate reports of violence in the area, and Ethiopian Airlines has suspended flights to Mekelle, Shire, and Axum due to the “current situation.” While there are unverified reports that Tigray forces have seized control of regional airports, the agency could not independently confirm these claims.
Experts describe the developments as a major escalation. Kjetil Tronvoll, an Oslo-based peace researcher, stated, “I think the war has already begun.” Gerrit Kurtz, a security analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, echoed this sentiment, calling the situation “a step towards a war. “
Both sides are advancing conflicting accounts of the triggers for this escalation. On September 23, the National Regional Government of Tigray issued a statement claiming its forces were acting defensively against an attack by the federal government. It accused Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration of launching a “genocidal invasion” and ordered its troops to defend the population. The Tigray government also alleged that Addis Ababa has conducted recent air, drone, and artillery strikes, though it claimed to have previously restrained itself to de-escalate tensions. These allegations have not been independently verified.
Conversely, the federal government frames the events as part of a coordinated threat involving various armed groups opposed to the prime minister. This divergence highlights a central obstacle to any renewed peace effort: the parties cannot even agree on the basic interpretation of the escalation.
The crisis is deeply rooted in the shortcomings of the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement. While the deal ended the two-year war between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), it failed to address underlying political and territorial disputes. The status of Western Tigray remains particularly contentious, and the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons is still unresolved. Additionally, questions regarding Tigray’s political representation and its relationship with the federal government continue to fuel tensions.
“The Pretoria agreement stopped the fighting, but it did not resolve the underlying political conflict,” said Tronvoll. He noted that the core disagreement centers on Ethiopia’s political structure. The TPLF advocates for strong federalism and regional autonomy, whereas Abiy Ahmed’s government pursues a more centralized model. Thus, the issue extends beyond implementing specific provisions of the peace deal; it involves competing visions for governing Ethiopia.
Adding to the complexity is an emerging alliance of seven armed groups opposing Abiy, which includes the TPLF, Fano forces from the Amhara region, and the Oromo Liberation Army. Some of these factions were bitter enemies during the Tigray war, making their cooperation a significant but potentially fragile political development. Kurtz observed that the alliance has been developing for some time and that its leaders have reportedly held meetings.
“It was a very important development,” Kurtz said. “The alliance has been in the making for a long time.” However, he pointed out fundamental differences among the members, suggesting that political disagreements remain and will likely be resolved only after they achieve their shared goal of overthrowing the current government. Tronvoll similarly characterized the cooperation as primarily tactical, questioning whether the groups can sustain a long-term political and military strategy.
Another complicating factor is Eritrea. The Ethiopian government has accused its neighbor of supporting the anti-Abiy alliance, allegations Eritrea denies. Kurtz noted reports of contacts between the armed groups and Eritrea but emphasized that the alliance appears to be a domestic grouping. The geographic dispersion of the alliance’s members across different regions also poses logistical challenges for coordinating military operations.
The immediate priority, according to Kurtz, is for both Ethiopian armed forces and Tigray security forces to halt active hostilities. However, ending the fighting requires more than a ceasefire, as the conflict has fragmented across Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia. Regional actors like Eritrea may also be playing a role.
International mediation has so far failed to produce a new political process, despite warnings from global actors. Kurtz argued that while the United States remains an important player, Washington has not shown sufficient engagement. He suggested that the African Union, the European Union, and other international bodies could help, but noted no single actor has enough influence over all parties. A coalition of diplomatic efforts would be necessary, potentially using the UN General Assembly as a platform for direct engagement.
Tronvoll criticized the limited international response, noting that warning signs were visible for some time. For the people of Tigray, the stakes are incredibly high, as the region is still recovering from the 2020-2022 war. Many remain displaced, infrastructure is damaged, and economic recovery is fragile. A return to large-scale war would not merely resume old conflicts but could ignite a broader security crisis, especially given simultaneous conflicts in Amhara and Oromia.
The urgent task is to prevent the latest fighting from spiraling into a wider war. Any sustainable settlement must address the political questions left unresolved by the 2022 agreement. The key challenge is whether Ethiopia and its international partners can create enough diplomatic space to prevent the current escalation from shutting the door on a political solution.
Experts saying the war has already begun is chilling. We need humanitarian corridors, not more political blame games right now.
Ethiopian Airlines suspending flights is a bad sign. It feels like we are sliding back into the chaos of 2020.
Does anyone else think the alliance between TPLF and Fano is just tactical? They were enemies just two years ago.
I am not surprised. The status of Western Tigray was always a landmine that neither side was willing to defuse properly.
This is terrifying. The pretoria agreement was supposed to hold, but it clearly hasn’t resolved the core political disputes.