Will Houthi Attacks Trigger the Mecca Joint Defence Pact?

Yemen’s Houthi rebels have seized the strategic port of Mocha and are now threatening dominance over the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a critical maritime waterway. The group has also launched attacks on multiple Saudi cities, injuring approximately 70 people, including women and children. These escalating hostilities against Saudi energy, civil, and defence infrastructure, alongside the maritime blockade coordinated by Iran and its Houthi allies, have reignited debate over the operationalisation of the Mecca Pact—a mutual defence agreement between Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, and Pakistan.

The potential activation of this treaty raises significant questions about the scope of Pakistani and Turkish intervention. The discussion unfolds against a backdrop of shifting US foreign policy; Washington has indicated that regional actors must assume primary responsibility for their own defence, with American support becoming more limited. This stance is evident since the onset of the US-Israel conflict with Iran, during which the US struggled to provide comprehensive protection for its Gulf partners and failed to prevent attacks on its own regional bases.

In response to the diminishing US security guarantee, Gulf states have pursued new defensive frameworks. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan initially signed a mutual defence accord in September 2025, which expanded in August to include Turkiye, forming the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. The pact’s joint secretariat is headquartered in Riyadh, with Pakistan holding the chairmanship for an initial three-year term.

Despite its establishment, the agreement remains in a developmental stage. It has not publicly defined the specific thresholds or scenarios that would trigger direct military intervention, nor has it formalised rules of engagement or collective deterrence mechanisms. However, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif recently stated that unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia or a spill-over of the Yemen conflict into the kingdom would render the pact operational.

Turkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan clarified last month that the Mecca Pact functions similarly to NATO. Under this model, an attacked member state must actively request assistance and specify the type of help required. This mirrors NATO’s Article 4, which allows for consultation, and Article 5, which mandates mutual assistance while leaving the nature of that assistance to individual member decisions. A precedent was set in 2012 when Turkey invoked Article 4 after a Syrian warplane was shot down, requesting Patriot missile batteries rather than direct combat intervention.

Consequently, for the Mecca Pact to be activated, Saudi Arabia would need to define the specific military support it requires. If Riyadh formally requests direct Pakistani military intervention beyond intelligence and material aid, Islamabad would be obligated to comply, though the scale of the response would still require consultation. Currently, Saudi Arabia has not invoked the pact with either nation.

Diplomatic channels remain active, with Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud engaging Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. Islamabad has publicly urged Tehran to restrain the Houthis, reminding Iran of Pakistan’s defence commitments under the pact, while Ankara is expected to contribute its own diplomatic efforts.

If diplomacy fails and Houthi attacks persist, Turkiye and Pakistan are likely to expand their existing air and technological support. Pakistan currently deploys around 16 JF-17 Thunder fighter jets, defence systems, and thousands of troops in Saudi Arabia. However, a direct military operation by Pakistani forces inside Yemen remains improbable. Due to the lasting economic, security, and sectarian impacts of its involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan is wary of entering a conflict with Iran and its allies that could destabilise its western border provinces.

Instead, the most plausible scenario involves Pakistan increasing diplomatic pressure on Iran, bolstering Saudi defensive capabilities, and advocating for a multinational naval coalition to secure the Bab al-Mandeb. This restrained approach would uphold the essence of the Mecca Pact while prioritising regional de-escalation. As this new security architecture matures over years, bilateral defence relationships will continue to address immediate defensive needs until formal collective response mechanisms are fully developed.