United States President Donald Trump has openly expressed his opposition to BRICS, threatening a supplementary 10% tariff last year on any nation that aligns with what he characterized as the bloc’s “anti-American policies.” His administration has since intensified the use of tariffs against key trading partners, including Brazil, India, and China. The underlying message from Washington is clear: challenging US economic dominance will incur financial penalties.
However, this coercive strategy may be counterproductive. As BRICS leaders gather in New Delhi, Trump’s actions are likely reinforcing the very incentives that initially drew countries to the group. By demonstrating a willingness to weaponize access to US markets, the financial system, and the dollar for political gain, Washington is providing compelling reasons for other nations to decrease their reliance on these American-centric structures.
This dynamic does not signify the emergence of an anti-US alliance. The bloc’s 11 members—Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates— harbor significant political and economic disparities. Collectively representing nearly half the global population and roughly 40% of global GDP, they lack a unified ideology, security policy, or geopolitical stance. Recent tensions highlight these divides, particularly between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, while India and China only recently stabilized relations following deadly border skirmishes in 2020-2021.
Instead of creating a cohesive geopolitical front against Washington, Trump’s policies may be providing divergent nations with a common economic motivation to cooperate: shielding themselves from vulnerability to US power. For countries outside the Western core, dependence on US-dominated infrastructure carries inherent risks. The dollar’s central role grants the US substantial structural advantages, as international transactions often flow through institutions subject to US jurisdiction, and sanctions can isolate governments from parts of the global financial system.
While BRICS aims to diminish this dependence, it is unlikely to displace the dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency. Despite frequent predictions of a new BRICS currency during summits, the IMF reports that the dollar accounted for 57.1% of global foreign-exchange reserves in the first quarter of 2026, compared to just 2% for the Chinese renminbi. Indeed, the dollar’s share increased slightly during that period.
Replacing the dollar and merely reducing dependence on it are distinct objectives. BRICS members are already experimenting with the latter. South Africa has linked to China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System for direct renminbi settlements, while Brazil and China increasingly use their own currencies in bilateral trade. India and the UAE have settled transactions in rupees and dirhams, and China and Russia have shifted much of their trade to national currencies. Additionally, the New Development Bank has set a strategic goal to allocate 30% of its financing in local currencies, potentially rising to 40-50% in the 2027-2031 cycle.
Recent events underscore the urgency of these measures. In July, Washington imposed a 25% tariff on various Brazilian exports despite running a trade surplus with the country, and has scrutinized Brazil’s Pix instant-payment system. Meanwhile, sanctions on Russia and Iran have pushed them toward alternative payment arrangements, and the US is considering penalties for countries heavily reliant on Russian energy, including China and India.
Most BRICS nations do not seek to swap dependence on Washington for dependence on Beijing. Countries like India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE maintain extensive ties with the West while expanding relations with China. Their goal is to increase their maneuverability between competing power centers rather than replace one hegemon with another.
While individual transactions settled in local currencies will not overthrow dollar dominance, multiplying such arrangements over time reduces the cost for nations to resist US pressure. Consequently, portraying BRICS as an anti-US threat risks being self-defeating; punishing countries for seeking alternatives simply encourages them to develop those alternatives further. Trump intends to make challenging US power expensive, but his policies may ultimately make dependence on it even more costly for other nations.
So basically, threatening other countries just pushes them closer together. Did anyone in the administration actually read the economic history books?
India and China stabilizing relations is huge. It proves these nations can cooperate economically despite serious geopolitical tensions and border disputes.
The dollar still dominates global reserves at 57 percent. I wonder if BRICS can ever realistically challenge that dominance, or if this is just political posturing?
It is fascinating to see how coercive tariffs are actually strengthening the very bloc Washington fears most. History shows this approach rarely works.